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 A Necessity of Morals 
 
Introduction 
 
 In his address to the senior philosophy seminar at Pepperdine University on 
March 11th, 2015 Dr. John Martin Fischer told the students that his initial motivation for 
his work The Metaphysics of Free Will was “to defend moral culpability from the threats 
of causal determinism and divine omniscience” while also asserting semi-compatibilism. 
Taking that a step further, the goal for my own work is to defend our need for moral 
culpability from a metaphysical standpoint. In this essay I will argue that ultimately there 
are only two possibilities when it comes to a moral-metaphysical framework, only one of 
which involves human culpability: either human existence has intrinsic meaning and 
worth, therefore giving weight to our moral decision making and warranting our own 
culpability when making moral judgments, or that there is ultimately no objective value 
to human existence, thereby neutralizing any supposed moral implications attached to our 
actions.  
Western Civilization has arrived at a point where it is now a commonly held 
belief that morality is relative to the culture that employs it and that there are no 
universally set ethical principles that people should be compelled to follow. This vague, 
harmless, and socially appeasing view goes by many names: Postmodernism, relativism, 
binkyism1 (credit to Mason Marshall, this one is my personal favorite), the list goes on. 
                                                        
1 Mason Marshall. Handout, “Binkyism” Modern Philosophy Course. Pepperdine University, Spring 
2015:  
“Binkyism is the view that there are certain beliefs which for the following reasons are not worth 
evaluating. 1. Their truth or falsity is relative to persons or cultures 2. They haven’t been shown to be 
true 3. They can’t be shown to be true 4. They can’t be true or false. Binkyism is a response to a 
pervasive problem. Nowadays public debate on political, ethical, and religious issues has a shrill tone: 
Bill O’Reilly, John Stewart, Bill Maher, and everyone else talk as if people who disagree with them 
While such a claim may seem appealing in that it is inherently inclusive of outside 
cultures and beliefs within any given social framework, most especially a “pluralistic 
society” like the modern western world it also carries the (allegedly2) unintended 
consequence of robbing morality of its value in the form of human culpability.   
My first task is to track the status of said culpability through the different 
metaphysical theories contained under the umbrella of the free will problem. From there I 
can begin to devise what meta-ethical frameworks best fit with what I know about free 
will. Throughout this essay I will be drawing heavily from the works of the philosopher 
Robert Kane, namely A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will and Ethics and the 
Quest for Good.  
Argument A: Establishing a Need for a Metaphysical Framework 
While naysayers may cry out in protest that this “unintended consequence” is 
harmless, I remain thoroughly unconvinced. Any notion that human beings when left 
alone will naturally gravitate towards performing selfless acts in the name of goodness 
rather than succumbing to their biologically preprogramed (and evolution tested), 
survival ensuring selfish tendencies remains in my view an utter fantasy. This is what 
necessitates law and order, whether it be physically enforced by the state or 
metaphysically imposed by a higher power. 
Still, dissenters may cry out that it is not the purpose of the law to legislate and 
enforce morality—I both agree and disagree with that statement. Morality informs the 
law, and the law is designed to preserve the liberty of the citizens who follow it while 
                                                                                                                                                                     
aren’t just mistaken but are also either stupid or perverse. Binkyism is supposed to combat the 
problem by making us less sure of ourselves: the hope is, if we’re less confident that we are correct, 
we’ll all be gentler with one another.” 
2 Binkyism 
guarding their freedoms and their lives from those who would harm or infringe on either. 
To quote Kane: 
“Debates about free will lead to issues about crime and punishment, 
blameworthiness and responsibility, coercion and control, mind and body, necessity and 
possibility, time and chance, right and wrong… it touches ethics, social and political 
philosophy, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, theory of knowledge, philosophy of law, 
philosophy of science, and philosophy of religion.”3 
 As one can see, the Stakes are high. As I will show in the following pages, the 
same “freedom” that these western societies pride themselves on cultivating loses value 
alarmingly quickly when agents in said society are no longer held accountable for their 
actions. In short, moral culpability is the thing that gives our freedom value.  
Some people reading this might already be objecting on the grounds that most of 
what I am referring to are surface freedoms—namely, mundane choices we make every 
day, consciously and unconsciously. What possible moral implications could the brand of 
milk I choose to buy have? Again, I believe Kane says it best when he makes the 
distinction between surface freedom and freedom of will. The former amounts to making 
the decisions described above while the latter amounts to agents being able to do the 
things we want (and the freedom to have done otherwise should we have wished it) free 
of any constraints, physical, psychological, or otherwise.4 What happens though if the 
distinction isn’t between which brand of milk to buy? Without some constraints to inform 
our actions, be it legal, moral, or physical, what would stop an agent from choosing to go 
                                                        
3 Kane, Robert (I). A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. Page 2. Oxford University Press. 2005. 
4 Kane (I), Page 14 
buy milk or go shoot the people next door instead?5(Unless you are Ted Bundy, in which 
case you are on your own) 
Science, religion, philosophy and psychology all present differing viewpoints as 
to what governs the actions of moral agents. (This list is short for the sake of brevity and 
in no way is meant to be comprehensive or binding) Physicists may say that all of our 
actions are determined by the vibrations and movement patterns of particles at the atomic 
level while psychologists may assert that free will is simply a grand self-deception 
society engages in out of fear of being controlled (both of these theories representing 
determinism). Religious authorities, be them teachers or holy texts may assert a vast 
multitude of possibilities. Most religions serve the important social function of teaching 
people the right way to act in accordance with the rules of a given society (a crude 
definition for ethics), the metaphysical implications being either that these behaviors 
being promoted are either the expressed will of a divine power or that all actions and 
events involving the physical world and agents in it are simply actors in a cosmic opera 
that has been playing out since the beginning of the universe.  
Philosophy offers us innumerable ways to address the way humanity should 
exercise freedom. The study of ethics informs us what actions are right and wrong while 
asking questions about our freedom to make right or wrong decisions entails a multitude 
                                                        
5 Ted Bundy was a serial murderer and rapist who was found guilty of killing 30 different women in 
seven states over a four year period. After multiple intense vetting processes by a number of 
criminologists and psychiatrists, he was found to be completely sane and claimed full responsibility 
for his actions after being convicted, much to the surprise of the general public. When asked about 
his motivations for his horrendous crimes, he had this to say “I’m the most cold-hearted son-of-a-
bitch you’ll ever meet” and “I’m not going to kid you. I deserve certainly the most extreme 
punishment society has…I think society deserves to be protected from me and others like me” (1989 
interview with James Dobson)  The important thing for my purposes here is that Bundy seemed 
acutely aware of the evil of what he had done, albeit without the emotional reaction of empathy. He 
self-reported that his desire began with addiction to pornography which eventually grew into a fetish 
for violence against women. Ted Bundy was executed in Pensacola, Florida by the electric chair in 
1989. 
of facets worth considering. Let us return to the potential positions posited above through 
physics and psychology. The belief that all actions taken by agents are preordained by 
either our biological make up or the vibrations of the universe is known as determinism.   
Determinism becomes problematic for culpability in two key ways. The first issue 
is that if determinism is true, then people are not truly free in any sense as the supposed 
choices made by agents have been predestined for them. This inference leads directly into 
the second problem which is if agents are not actually making decisions themselves due 
to unseen forces beyond the control then said agents cannot be held responsible for their 
actions (Here I am presupposing that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for free will and thus moral culpability).  
Whether or not one endorses determinism or not, one can easily see the problems 
this creates for us not only as agents but also as a supposedly well-functioning and just 
society. How can we rightly convict and imprison a fellow agent if they did not truly 
elect to do whatever wrong thing it was that landed them in court in the first place? 
People who endorse this view may counter that punitive action like incarceration or 
execution at that point would be for the benefit of the society itself by removing a 
threatening agent from the general population, but this view almost entirely negates any 
potentially redemptive aspects of justice.  
The second major issue with determinism is culpability. How can an agent be 
responsible in any moral sense if the agent was not free to choose the actions in question? 
Throughout my study of this issue, I have yet to find any account by a determinist 
reconciling culpability with this theory. Taking this into account, for the rest of my essay 
I will be ruling out determinism as a potential backdrop for my moral-metaphysical 
framework. 
The next theory of free will I wish to discuss is compatibilism, which holds that 
there really is no conflict between free will and determinism after all and that any 
supposed conflicts between these two schools of thought boil down to misunderstandings 
of both concepts. Compatibilists maintain that freedom means that as an agent one has 
the power or ability to take a given action free of any constraints that may befall them, be 
it physical, coercive, or compulsive. The key difference here lies in one’s ability to do 
otherwise—one could have done otherwise had the agent wanted to, however since in the 
physical sense such alternative possibilities remain hypothetical, adherents to this view 
believe that this situation can still fall into the determinist camp6. Upon examination it 
becomes easy to see how this view of the world became very popular amongst the 
enlightenment crowd (Hobbes, Locke, Hume and company) as a way of seemingly 
maintaining human culpability through freedom but also attempting to account for their 
ever-shifting world view as new developments in the sciences seemingly explained away 
the mysteries of existence and human endeavor.  As convinced as these great men of the 
18th century were, I am still skeptical. It seems to me that while in the hypothetical sense 
our potential actions that we could have taken do not carry any weight morally or 
metaphysically, if there is only one road that we could have taken for whatever reason, be 
it atomic vibrations or predestination, then we were not truly free to make the other 
potential choices and that our culpability is merely an illusion.  
                                                        
6 Kane (I), Page 13 
Compatibilists may respond that the important thing here is not to confuse 
causation and constraint, meaning that while we must realize that our current decisions 
are immediately informed and affected by our previous ones—cause and effect, I am 
sitting here writing this essay instead of walking to the beach because I have made prior 
decisions to procrastinate—I am not actually constrained to sit in this chair. I am 
perfectly capable of not finishing this assignment, failing the senior capstone class and 
subsequently not graduating from college. (Not) My response to this criticism lies in the 
opposing philosophical camp, Incompatibilism. The philosopher Peter van Inwagen is 
perhaps the most prominent incompatibilist thinker working today and to counter the 
above inference that our decisions are caused by the past he asserts the Consequence 
argument. If determinism is true in any sense, then all of our actions are the consequences 
of either the laws of nature or past events. We lack the power or ability to affect the past 
or the laws of the physical universe, therefore the consequences of these things, including 
our own actions, are ultimately not up to us.7 For those thinkers looking to assert our 
culpability, Incompatibilism looks quite promising.  
I will consider the next theory, Libertarianism. Libertarianism in the context of 
free will refers to the belief that agents have metaphysical freedom —that human agency 
is not constrained by any outside forces such as atomic vibrations, neural wiring, or 
divine predestination.8 For those looking to assert and defend culpability as I am, one 
would be hard pressed to find a theory that fits this need better than libertarianism.  
That is not to say that Libertarianism lacks its fair share of critics. Dissenters 
argue that if human existence were truly not bound by any of the potential parameters in 
                                                        
7 Kane (I), Page 23 
8 Kane (I), page 32 
question, be it the laws of the physical universe, our brain chemistry, or intervention from 
a divine force, then the only thing left is chaos. The randomness that pervades throughout 
human existence would act as a parameter to freedom in and of itself; Kane uses an 
example of a man whose arm suddenly twitches while he is cutting a piece of fine linen, 
causing him to ruin it.9 It would seem that such an event would be a hindrance to the 
man’s will, impeding him from freely achieving his purpose.  
While I agree that randomness would in this case become a hindrance to the man 
cutting linen, the important aspect for my purposes is the effect said parameter would 
have on the man’s agency. When it comes to uninterrupted decision making, randomness 
may even heavily influence the choice of a given agent while necessitating nothing about 
that particular decision. Kane uses the example of a man deciding between Colorado and 
Hawaii for his vacation—though he enjoys skiing and has many friends in Colorado, the 
man is free to choose to go surfing in Hawaii instead.10 With this in mind I 
wholeheartedly believe this theory is the right backdrop when it comes to grounding my 
defense of human culpability.  
Argument B: Identifying what that Metaphysical Framework Entails 
 “The starting points of our enquiry are two of the conditions for modernity—
namely, pluralism and uncertainty—which have played a pivotal role in raising doubts 
about the possibility of objective values and ethical standards in the minds of ordinary 
persons and in the human sciences and philosophy.” 11 
                                                        
9 Kane (I), Page 35 
10 Kane (I), Page 36 
11 Robert Kane (II). Ethics and the Quest for Good. Page 8. Cambridge University Press. 2010. E Book  
Up until this point I have examined the metaphysical theories that dominate the 
free will problem. My next concern primarily deals with another aspect of metaphysics: 
Meta-ethics. Like Metaphysics, Meta-ethics is the branch of analytical philosophy that 
deals with the foundations of the nature of right and wrong—how it is we can know what 
is moral and immoral—as opposed to normative ethics which is concerned with the 
actions taken by the agent individually. In ancient times these two disciplines would have 
been undertaken together—Plato and Aristotle both believed that searching for that which 
is the source of goodness was just as relevant to philosophy as doing those things they 
judged to be right. The modern day separation of normative and meta-ethics is a product 
of the same postmodernist mindset that right and wrong only apply in the context of 
one’s obligations towards another and that good and evil do not matter in and of 
themselves. On this point Kane has this to say:  
“A number of philosophers, including Bernard Williams, have noted that the 
tendency in modern times to think of morality in this narrow way—as a matter of 
obligations or duties we have towards ourselves and others; and they have contrasted this 
view with that of the ancient philosophers who meant by the study of ethics an inquiry 
into the nature of the good and the good life generally”.12 I will have more to say on this 
in a little while.  
Meta-ethical theories about the nature of right and wrong typically divide into 
three main camps. The first camp is moral absolutism, which is the idea that right and 
wrong exist and remain unchanging in a metaphysical sense as they relate to human 
action. The second major theory is moral relativism which proposes that the ethical value 
                                                        
12 Kane (II) Page 61. 
of a given action is dependent upon situational factors and to a great extent are contingent 
upon the agent performing the action and the social context the action took place in. 
Finally, moral nihilism is the idea that there is no need for, nor is there even a way to 
measure, moral good and evil. I will consider each of these in depth now.   
 
Moral Nihilism 
Moral Nihilism, or simply Nihilism as it is more popularly known, is the theory 
that life and physical existence lack any objective meaning and that any and all supposed 
moral frameworks do not exist in an objective sense. The consequence of this view is that 
no moral decisions can be prescribed a value as being more preferable than another and 
that right and wrong are simply abstract cultural constructs humanity adheres to for social 
stability.  
 Popularized by Fredrich Nietzsche in the 19th century, Nihilism is unique in that 
rather than promoting a certain normative ethical construct for its adherents to ascribe to, 
it rejects granting value in any moral sense and instead asserts two potential viewpoints 
regarding morality. The first ethical theory (if you can call it that) endorsed by nihilism is 
error theory, which states that no matter how hard people try to assert any sort of 
objective moral framework fall short of truly prescribing value to moral judgments.  The 
second theory found within the nihilist worldview is expressivism, which holds that any 
and all value attributed to moral judgments are false because they are simply the opinion 
of the agent in question. (See the “Binkyism” footnote on page 3)  
 On an interesting note, meta-ethical nihilism (if there is such thing) becomes a 
problem in that it is a self-refuting argument to say as a meta-ethical law meta-ethical 
truths do not exist in any sense. In short, Nihilism is a dud when it comes to trying to 
establish metaphysical free will, however it may not rule out physical free will as the 
randomly generated universe may still be developing—in that instance, one would have 
to discern if the expanding and contracting movements of the cosmos had any sort of 
physical impact on human agency. (But that’s another essay, for another time.)  
Moral Relativism 
 Moral Relativism is the meta-ethical theory that the moral value of a given action 
is contingent upon the cultural context in which said action is taking place. In this view, 
right and wrong differ according to the people group being judged. This worldview is the 
absolute epitome of the postmodern thought I have set out to debunk.  
 Three main normative theories arise from the meta-ethical construct of moral 
relativism. The first one bears the same name as its parent worldview. Moral relativism 
from a normative standpoint refers to the theory that morality is entirely contingent on the 
society practicing it and specifically that all prescriptive claims made by a practitioner of 
the theory only stand up to scrutiny when they are made within the context of that 
respective agents culture.  
 The second normative theory that arises from meta-ethical relativism is 
consequentialism or utilitarianism. While it may seem slightly odd to see this theory 
nestled up to normative relativism, it is important to see that they necessarily derive from 
the same meta-ethical worldview. Utilitarianism, while asserting that there is a right and 
wrong course of action for an agent to take, shifts the moral value of each possible action 
based on the context in which it is being performed. Largely the brainchild of the great 
19th century English philosopher and politician John Stuart Mill, consequentialism holds 
that the end goal of morality is the maximization of pleasure and happiness for the largest 
segment of people possible while simultaneously minimizing the pain and suffering of 
the corresponding group. Mill’s primary motivation when promoting utilitarianism was 
the benefit of the public--- as a member of parliament he was often exposed to and 
consequently sympathetic to the needs and desires of Britain’s working class.  
The way I see it, two main problems arise here: first, how does one define and 
quantify pleasure or happiness? It seems that is an overtly subjective criterion on which 
to predicate moral judgments and value. John Stuart Mill attempted to address this 
problem facing Utilitarianism in his book of the same name.13 “Those who know 
anything about the matter are aware that every writer from Epicurus to Bentham who 
maintained the theory of Utility meant by it is not ‘something to be contrasted with 
pleasure but pleasure itself together with the absence of pain’”14 though later he attempts 
to qualify pleasure in the two main categories of higher and lower pleasures, I still have 
serious misgivings with this account of the good. His argument goes like this:  
1. People experience  two types of pleasure, A and B 
2. People who have enjoyed both pleasures seem to prefer A over B 
3. A is a higher pleasure compared to B 
4. A is better than B. 
At this point I believe it becomes clear that this argument is a little better than hedonism 
at this point. This is relativistic in two major ways: first, Pleasure, while seemingly stable 
across the human experience, ultimately comes down to personal preference and neural 
                                                        
13 John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism. Fraser Magazine, London. 1861. E book. 
www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/mill1863.pdf. Copyright 2012. 
14 Mill, Page 4. 
wiring. While bathing is generally seen as a pleasurable activity to most people, someone 
stricken with Allodynia15 would wholeheartedly disagree.  
The second problem as I see it stems from the first. How can an agent make an 
objective moral judgment if the ethical system in place denies that such judgments are 
possible? Even if we ruled out people who specific medical conditions like the one 
mentioned here, how could one quantify one pleasure versus the other? Sexual 
intercourse and Opera are both intensely pleasurable, but in completely non-fungible 
ways. Taking this into account, I do not see how utilitarianism can escape from the 
relativist camp.  
  The third normative theory I believe falls under the relativist meta-ethical world 
view is social contract theory. Written on by many thinkers over the centuries, this theory 
centers around what Thomas Hobbes referred to as the “State of Nature”, a view of 
human existence prior to civilization in which he affectionately describes life as “nasty, 
brutish, and short” and as a “war against all”.16 The ethical theory arises out of man’s 
need to survive such a horrendous existence, and this is most effectively accomplished by 
a mutual covenant where all partaking members consent to collectively give up some of 
their rights for the greater good—in other words, agent A promises not to perform act B 
as long as agent C promises not to perform act B either.  
 Those who disagree with me will say that social contract theory isn’t relativistic 
because of the universal applicability of the above claim. Most societies on earth have 
prohibitions against murder, theft, and differing forms of public indecency (“action B”). 
                                                        
15 Allodynia is a medical condition characterized by extreme pain upon stimulation of the skin, even 
from activities that would normally be enjoyable. This condition was made famous by Howard 
Hughes who struggled with Allodynia the majority of his life.  
16 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. London. 1651  
That being said, I do not believe such a claim can be truly universal--one need not even 
imagine a potential world where “action B” is something totally random—this occurs 
across cultures all the time.17 I also take issue with the hierarchical biases present with 
this theory—as many feminist and other social critics will point out, the social contract 
present in a feudal society would completely disenfranchise those on the lower rungs of 
the social order. For example, in Medieval Japan it was considered acceptable for a 
samurai to test his newly forged sword by killing any beggar he came across on his land. 
Similarly, in certain parts of sub-Saharan Africa, female genital mutilation is still widely 
practiced as a means of preventing female infidelity. In both of these societies, the 
contract being practiced is entirely predicated on those exercising control. This makes the 
theory relative to those practicing it and provides shaky footing at best for establishing an 
objective measure of agent culpability.  
 As a sight anecdote, the last component to consider, and potentially the saving 
grace for the utilitarian normative view is consequentialism. Consequentialism, while 
often going hand and hand with the hedonistic aspects of utilitarianism, does offer the 
redemptive quality for my purpose in that agents are held accountable for the results they 
produce. Regardless of the society where it is being practiced, the agent in question 
would still have to answer for whatever it was he or she brought about. (this will become 
relevant later on in my argument) 
Moral Absolutism 
                                                        
17 For example, in aboriginal Australian culture it is considered wrong to mention the names of the 
dead once they have passed on from this life—such an action is deemed unlucky and also 
disrespectful to the person in question. In most western societies, not referring to or talking about a 
dead relative on purpose would be considered extremely rude and an insult to the memory of that 
individual. This cultural dissonance did not arise out of any biological or societal necessity as some 
critics would normally point out when it comes to most cultural difference, it is completely 
contingent on the culture practicing the individual action.  
Moral absolutism holds that it is not only possible for agents to know right and 
wrong, but that it is morally necessary for one to discern these things as part of human 
flourishing. As mentioned above, moral absolutism has its roots in the theories of some of 
the most ancient thinkers in western thought and pervades throughout the majority of 
prominent faith systems as a part of a larger religious metaphysical worldview (though 
each of these religions may have vastly different verdicts regarding the source, 
motivations, and moral maxims derived from said worldview).  
It should come as no surprise after taking this into account that one of the most 
prevalent normative ethical constructs to arise from this meta-ethical worldview is Divine 
Command Theory. Initially made infamous by Plato in the Euthyphro, Divine Command 
Theory holds the view that we can know what is right and wrong based on the instruction 
from a divine source, namely holy texts as interpreted by religious scholars and leaders. 
This theory has taken American Protestantism by storm over the last century and 
consequently enjoys a place of honor amongst pop Christianity in the United States and 
abroad, with the bible serving as the primary means by which humans are to discern the 
proper way to conduct their lives and to use as a source of goodness on earth.  
The second normative theory to materialize out of moral realism is Natural Law 
Theory. Originally conceived in antiquity by Aristotle, the concept of Natural Law came 
to be popularized in the western cannon by the medieval philosopher St. Thomas 
Aquinas. Natural Law Theory holds that we can discern what is right and wrong through 
observation of the physical universe—that the divinely-preordained order we see in 
nature is indicative of good and likewise the disruption of that order as evil. Due to the 
work and influence of St. Thomas on reconciling Aristotelian thought with Christianity, 
Natural Law Theory enjoys the position of authority for the Roman Catholic Church and 
consequently for over one billion people worldwide. 
The most unique view certainly to fit within the theory of moral absolutism is 
Deontological ethics. Theorized by the continental philosopher Immanuel Kant in the 18th 
century, Deontology holds that the moral maxims prescribed by it are entirely a priori, 
meaning they exist independently of anything we usually relegate to the realm of 
experience and that all such moral maxims are absolute and unflinching no matter the 
circumstance. Murder, Theft, and lying are all and will always be wrong—even if done 
for a supposedly moral reason such as protecting the innocent from harm or retrieving a 
previously stolen item for its original owner. I call Deontology unique not because of the 
severity of its claims but rather because it asserts them without necessitating the authority 
of a divine power. 
Putting it Together 
 Where does this leave us? For 15 pages I have lead my readers down a trail 
covering the metaphysical accounts of free will and meta-ethical accounts of morality and 
the normative theories they entail. Now comes the time for me to reconcile these 
accounts together in order to what I assert to be the mutually exclusive options we face—
either meta-ethically objective morality exists and humans as agents are culpable for their 
actions, or we cannot reconcile any of the theories of morality with our metaphysical 
accounts of free will and the whole thing falls apart.  
 First up to bat is determinism. Determinism rules out culpability by asserting that 
all of our choices are predetermined before we make them and our interactions with the 
greater universe are contingent in some way on either atomic movement, biology or 
psychological conditioning. (I have a feeling Nietzsche would really enjoy that 
assessment) The endpoint with this theory is that we do not have free will. Determinism 
is out. 
 Compatibilism is, by its very nature, an interesting case. Due to the nature of 
freedom in allowing for causation the compatibilist worldview, two normative theories 
immediately come to mind—divine command theory and Deontology. Divine command 
theory is compatible with metaphysical compatibilism because God (one of the potential 
constraints on free will being divine foreknowledge) is the source of all morality in this 
case. In the normative account of Divine command theory, God serves as both the 
beginning and the end of human moral discourse, challenging agents to perform actions 
according to his plan for humanity. Deontology is also compatible with compatibilism in 
that the agent is bringing about the action for its own sake—the fact that moral truths are 
seen as a priori serves as both a motivating and qualifying factor for culpability within 
this meta-ethical worldview.  
 And now we come to Libertarianism. Libertarianism asserts wholeheartedly that 
human agents have free will, and thus said agents are entirely culpable here. What does 
this mean for our normative considerations? The first thing we can infer from 
libertarianism is that if we are indeed metaphysically free, it is for two potential reasons. 
The first is that a higher power endowed us with the ability to exercise our moral muscles 
to find our way in the universe—this fits nicely with divine command theory, deontology, 
and the slim glimmer of hope found in the consequentialist aspect of utilitarianism. The 
point is, metaphysical libertarianism is a strong candidate for discerning meta-ethical and 
normative principles. On the other hand, if libertarianism is true because the universe is 
came about from a random singularity at some point in the distant past, then we are put in 
an interesting place when it comes to discerning human culpability. This is the one place 
where metaphysical nihilism could actually (albeit strangely) serve as a morally 
informative principle by showing implying the most freeing account of free will we could 
imagine: If God (or any other objective, all powerful, vindictive force does not exist, we 
would not have to interact with the moral parameters set by objective accounts of 
morality. If the universe is truly indetermined in the context specified here, then meta-
ethical morality does not and cannot exist in an objective sense.  
If I was a gambling man, I would put my money on the libertarian account of 
metaphysics, owing my decision to the way it provides both metaphysical and meta-
ethical space to maneuver in order to uncover the mystery of how man is to live. As Dr. 
Fischer said in his presentation referenced at the beginning of this paper, “you are more 
than welcome to disagree with me.” 
And now we have reached the end. I would like to quote Dr. Fischer by saying 
that “Even if I somehow discovered there is but one path into the future, I would still care 
deeply how I walked down that path. I would aspire to walk with grace and dignity. I 
would want to have a sense of humor. Most of all, I would want to do it my way.”18 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
18 John Martin Fischer. The Metaphysics of Free Will. Page 216. Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 1994. Print 
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